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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a two-country monetary DSGE model in which households choose a portfolio
of home and foreign equities, and a forward position in foreign exchange. Some goods prices are set
without full information of the state. We show that temporarily sticky nominal goods prices can have
large effects on equity portfolios. Home and foreign portfolios are not identical in equilibrium. In
response to technology shocks, sticky prices generate a negative correlation between labor income
and the profits of domestic firms, biasing portfolios in favor of home equities. In contrast, under
flexible prices, labor income and the profits of the domestic firms are positively correlated. Even a
small amount of nominal price stickiness can generate these portfolio differences, depending on the
diversification role played by the terms of trade. Returns on human capital and equities may be
positively correlated under sticky prices when the source of shocks is monetary, but this risk is








1.  Introduction 
 
In an open macroeconomy in which asset trade is possible, the portfolio choice of households 
may play an important role in understanding macro fluctuations.  In contrast to a closed economy 
model – in which a representative agent simply holds the market portfolio – agents in each country 
may hold different portfolios depending on the country-specific risks and returns that they encounter.  
Portfolio choice might matter for a number of questions: Does the international transmission 
mechanism depend on who owns firms?  Do changes in valuations of internationally traded assets 
play a role in the macroeconomic adjustment to shocks?  Is there an interaction between the stock 
market and exchange rates?
1
There is a long history in international finance of “portfolio balance” models of the open 
economy that integrate portfolio choice into an open-economy general equilibrium.  Black (1973), 
Branson (1977), and Branson and Henderson (1985) are prominent early efforts.  The earlier papers 
integrate asset choice into general equilibrium macro models by taking some ad hoc shortcuts.  But, 
for example, Lucas (1982) provides a fully optimizing model of portfolio balance, in which 
households trade bonds, equities, and claims to monetary transfer from the government.  Lucas (1982) 
and all subsequent fully-worked out portfolio-balance models have complete nominal goods price 
flexibility.  However, the earlier tradition focused on sticky-price models, which might be appropriate 
for the consideration of the real consequences of nominal exchange rate fluctuations.  There have 
been some attempts to incorporate optimizing portfolio choice into sticky-price macro models,
2 but 
none of these attempts successfully nest dynamic portfolio choice in a fully-optimizing model with 
agents maximizing subject to explicit dynamic budget constraints and with an explicit definition of 
equilibrium.  These models are still considered valuable tools for analyzing open economies (recent 
examples include Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa (2005) and Edwards (2005)),
3 but they lack a rigorous 
foundation.   As Obstfeld (2004, p. 557) notes, “we have no integrative general-equilibrium monetary 
model of international portfolio choice, although we need one.”  This paper fills the gap. 
But what do we learn by modeling portfolio choice in a sticky-price environment?  Indeed, it 
would seem at first blush that price stickiness should be a minor consideration for asset demands.  The 
value of an asset is determined by the expected present discounted value of its current and future 
payouts.  Since persistent productivity shocks drive the real payoffs of assets, price stickiness should 
have only a small effect on the expected present value.  One of the central insights of this paper is that 
transitory price stickiness can have a large impact on international asset choice.  It draws on the 
insight that terms-of-trade changes can provide substantial insurance for productivity shocks even in 
                                                 
1 On the first question, see for example Baxter and Crucini (1995), Kehoe and Perri (2002).  Gourinchas and 
Rey (2005) and Tille (2004) have recently addressed the second question.  Pavlova and Rigobon (2003), 
Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2005), and Hau and Rey (2006) are recent papers that have tried to 
answer the third question.   
2 See for example Dornbusch (1983). 
3 Recent examples include Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa (2005) and Edwards (2006). 
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the absence of trade in assets.  For example, a negative domestic productivity shock reduces the 
supply of home goods, but the effects of this shock on home income can be offset to some extent by 
an increase in the relative price of exports.  If prices are flexible, portfolio diversification may not 
increase expected utility much because of the automatic risk diversification from the terms-of-trade 
adjustment.  However, the risks encountered under sticky prices cannot be insured by terms-of-trade 
movements.  While these risks may be only transitory, they might have a dominant role in portfolio 
choice because the equity portfolio is the only means of insuring against these shocks.  When prices 
are sticky, the mix of home and foreign equities can differ dramatically from the mix under flexible 
prices, even when prices adjust relatively rapidly. 
We build a symmetric, two-country model in which agents have identical preferences in each 
country, firms use identical technologies, market structure is identical, and the stochastic processes of 
the driving variables (productivity and monetary) are identical.  In equilibrium, we find however that 
home and foreign portfolios are not identical.  This occurs because we assume that claims to human 
capital are not traded.  In fact, the equilibrium portfolio may exhibit home bias in equities.   
The “home bias” puzzle is one of the major puzzles in international finance. Empirical studies 
have found that foreign equities comprise a small proportion of investors' portfolios.
4  This finding is 
puzzling because it appears that investors are forgoing important opportunities for diversification of 
risk.
5  While there have been many suggested resolutions to the puzzle, none seem able to explain 
entirely the extent of home bias. Our model may contribute to an understanding of home bias.  It is 
related to one thread of the literature that has attempted to explain home bias as a hedge against non-
tradable risks.
6  If non-traded labor income is negatively correlated with returns to domestic equities, 
then domestic equities serve as a hedge for labor income.  That hedging incentive leads to home bias 
in equity portfolios. 
But there is considerable dispute over whether this could explain home bias.  In neoclassical 
models, because labor income is correlated more with domestic firms' profits than with those of 
foreign firms', the optimal portfolio will be more foreign-weighted than the classical endowment 
model predicts, as shown in Baxter and Jermann (1997). There have been some attempts to generalize 
the neoclassical model to generate this negative covariance of returns to human capital and domestic 
equities.
7  The empirical evidence on this correlation is mixed.
8
                                                 
4 French and Poterba (1991), Tesar and Werner (1995), and Warnock (2002), for example. 
5 Lewis (1999, 2000) surveys the literature on this puzzle and discusses the losses from non-diversification. 
6 For example, Eldor, Pines and Schwarz (1988), Stockman and Dellas (1989), Tesar (1993), Baxter, Jermann 
and King (1998), Serrat (2001) and Pesenti and van Wincoop (2002). A related analysis by Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(2001) argues that transactions costs to trade in international goods can help account for home bias in equities. 
7 Palacios-Huerta (2001) claims that a substantial fraction of home bias can be explained when the differential 
human capital of stockholders and non-stockholders is taken into account along with human capital frictions.  
Heathcote and Perri (2004) show that in a two-good model with investment that there may be home bias in an 
neoclassical setting.  See also Jermann (2002). 
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The second major insight of the paper is that it is not the unconditional correlation between 
domestic equity returns and human capital that is important.  What matters is the correlation 
conditional on the source of the shock.  In our model, the unconditional correlation between the return 
to human capital and the return to domestic equities (relative to foreign equities) could be positive.  
But home bias arises because that correlation is negative if the source of shocks is productivity. 
The intuition is straightforward: If all nominal prices are sticky, in the short run the level of 
output is demand determined. Productivity shocks have no effect on short-run output if the firm 
adjusts output only in response to changes in demand. For example, if home firms experience a 
positive productivity shock, their demand for labor will decline. Employment and wages will fall, but 
profits to the firm will increase. An effective hedge against employment and wage risk is ownership 
of the firm. If output is demand determined, the short-run returns to labor and firm owners are 
negatively correlated, in contrast to the usual presumption in neoclassical models. 
The fact that productivity shocks create a negative correlation between returns to workers and 
those to firm owners is a key implication of the model.  Gali (1999) builds a closed economy model 
under sticky prices and shows that it can generate a fall in labor hours in response to the positive 
technology shock, which rarely arises in a flexible price model.
9  His empirical work demonstrates 
that labor hours decline in response to positive technology shocks in most G7 countries. 
In our model, both monetary shock and technology shocks lead to consumption risk, but 
monetary shocks can be hedged effectively with bond portfolios (or by taking a forward position in 
foreign exchange.)  Unexpected changes in the relative supplies of money (at home and abroad) create 
nominal exchange rate changes that in turn alter the value of returns on home and foreign bonds. 
Monetary shocks lead to positively correlated changes in labor payments and profits, but that risk is 
not hedged with the equity portfolio.  The unconditional correlation of returns to human capital and 
domestic equities relative to foreign equities may be positive or negative, depending on the relative 
importance of monetary or productivity shocks, but there could still be considerable home bias.  This 
occurs in our model because of features that are not present in previous equilibrium models of 
international portfolio diversification.  Our model has two independent sources of shocks, and a non-
traded asset.  Moreover, because of the role of sticky nominal goods prices, the productivity shock 
and the monetary shock produce opposite correlations of returns to human capital and returns to 
domestic equities relative to foreign equities. 
Of course, nominal prices do not remain fixed forever when productivity or monetary shocks 
occur. Eventually an adjustment is made and neoclassical results obtain in the long run. Indeed, our 
model has real labor income positively correlated with productivity shocks in the long run. The degree 
                                                                                                                                                        
8 Baxter and Jermann (1997) produce evidence that the covariance is positive.  Botazzi, Pesenti, and van 
Wincoop (1996) and Pesenti and van Wincoop (2002) produce evidence to suggest that outside the US there is a 
weak negative correlation between returns to human capital and domestic equities.   
9 For example of flexible price models which generate a negative correlation, see Francis and Ramey (2005a) 
and Dotsey (2002). 
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of home bias depends on the persistence of price stickiness, the persistence of productivity shocks, 
and the weight that households assign to future consumption. We show that home bias is greater when 
prices adjust more slowly, when productivity shocks (in one country relative to the other) are less 
persistent, and when the future is discounted more heavily.  However, we emphasize that the degree 
of home bias also depends crucially on the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods.  
When that elasticity of substitution is near unity, the terms of trade provide nearly complete insurance 
for productivity shocks in the long run.  In that case, the welfare gains of insuring against short-run 
employment risk due to price stickiness dominate long-run considerations. 
Our chief aim is to provide a general equilibrium model of portfolio choice under sticky 
nominal prices in the open economy, not necessarily a model of home bias in equities.  The literature 
has taken many different approaches to explain home bias. In addition to the papers cited above that 
consider diversification against non-tradable risks, several other avenues have been explored. One 
group of studies has argued that the gains from international diversification are in fact small, so that 
small transactions costs of diversification will lead to heavily concentrated portfolios.
10  Others have 
claimed that acquisition of information about foreign firms is more costly than for information on 
home firms.
11  Another set of studies shows that home bias can be explained in the context of 
generalized preferences or prior beliefs.
12  Some claim that home bias is partly due to empirical 
mismeasurement.
13  All of these factors may help explain home bias. 
In the following sections, we present two kinds of models. The first is static.  It is much easier 
to understand the economic forces at work in the relatively simple static model, but the intuition we 
arrive at here carries over to the second model which is a more realistic dynamic one.  The reason the 
intuition carries over is that we find in the dynamic model that our asset portfolio replicates the risk 
sharing that would occur if a complete set of contingent claims were traded, so that investors’ wealth 
remains constant over time. 
 
2. The Simple Static Model 
 
We build a general-equilibrium, two-country model with sticky prices. We call the countries 
Home and Foreign. The world population is normalized to unity; half the population lives in Home 
and half in Foreign. Their preferences are identical. Households provide labor and own firms through 
equity. Firms use labor as the only input to produce a good monopolistically, and preset their prices in 
                                                 
10 For example, Cole and Obstfeld (1991), Tesar (1995), Butler and Joaquin (2002) and many others. However, 
van Wincoop (1994, 1999), for example, finds large unexploited gains from international risk sharing. 
11 For example, Kang and Stulz (1997) and Hasan and Simaan (2000).  A related recent study is van 
Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2005). 
12 For example, van Wincoop (1994), Aizenman (1999) as examples of the former and Pastor (2000) for the 
latter. 
13 For example, Rowland and Tesar (2004) find that multinationals may have provided diversification 
opportunities for some countries. 
  4 
the consumers' currency. Markets are segmented so that only firms can export goods. All goods are 
tradable and perishable.  In this section, the model is static. 
We adopt local currency pricing here. We observe in the data, at least for developed countries, 
that consumer prices are sticky in the consumers' currencies rather than in the producers' currencies. 
However, the pricing assumption is not particularly important in determining the equity portfolio. In 
fact, we would have exactly the same equity portfolio when prices are preset in producers' currencies, 
even though the equilibrium number of forward contracts differs.
14
In our model, we consider two kinds of shocks: monetary and technology shocks.  The 
distribution of shocks is identical between Home and Foreign. 
Finally, we assume that before the realization of shocks, only forward contracts in the foreign 
exchange and equities are traded. 
 
2.1 Households 
Households in both countries have identical preferences over the consumption basket, the real 
money of the domestic country, and leisure. There are two stages to the household decision problem.  
In the first stage, households choose a portfolio position: shares of Home equities ( h γ ), shares of 
Foreign equities ( f γ ), and a forward position in foreign exchange (δ ).  These are chosen before the 
resolution of uncertainty.  After shocks are realized, households choose consumption, labor supply 
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t C  denotes the consumption basket for Home;  t M denotes Home money;  , the price index; and  , 
the labor supply.   is a consumption basket of a representative Home household defined as 
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where  0 ω >  is the elasticity of substitution between Home produced goods and Foreign produced 
goods.   is the consumption basket of Home produced goods and  , ht C , f t C  is that of Foreign produced 
goods: 
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14 See Matsumoto (2004). 
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where λ  denotes the elasticity of substitution among varieties, with  1 λ > . Then we can write the CPI 
as follows: 
  () ( )
1/(1 ) 1/(1 ) 11 1
,, 2 th t f t PP P
ω ω ωω − − −− ≡+ , (2.5) 
where 
 
1/(1 ) 1/2 1
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1/(1 ) 1 1








where   is the price of Home goods i sold in Home in terms of the Home currency, and   
is the price of Foreign goods   sold in Home in terms of the Home currency. 
, () ht Pi , () ft Pi
i
Home households receive the following: wages ( , where    denotes the wage); 
dividends; transfers from the government ( ) and the gains or losses from forward contracts.  Equity 
dividends received by a Home household are given by 




ht f tt S γγ Π +Π , 
where   is the profit (dividend) of Home firms and  t Π
*
t Π  is that of Foreign firms in terms of the 
Foreign currency.
15    is the Home currency price of Foreign currency.  Home and Foreign 
households trade forward contracts in the foreign exchange.  The forward rate, 
t S
t F , is known at the 
time the forward contract is entered into, prior to the realization of shocks. After the shocks are 
realized, the Home households receive   units of Home currency.  ( ) tt SF δ − 
Foreign households have an analogous utility function for Foreign quantities and prices, 
which we will denote by superscript asterisks. Foreign prices are denominated in Foreign currency. 
Prior to the realization of shocks, the households choose the portfolio position to maximize 












16 subject to the constraint: 
 1 hf γ γ + = . (2.7) 
Note that there is no constraint on the forward position, δ .  We assume that the ex ante distribution of 
shocks are identical between Home and Foreign. This assumption, together with the assumptions of 
identical size and identical preferences, gives us an equilibrium in which the equity prices of Home 
and Foreign firms are the same prior to the realization of shocks.
17  In our normalization, the 
representative household of each country is endowed with an ownership share of 1 of their own firms, 
                                                 
15 Theoretically, profits can be negative in the case of a loss, but we have to assume that the profits of both 
Home firms and Foreign firms are positive to take logarithms. 
16  We use the notation that expectations are taken at time t-1 in this section – even though the model is static – 
for notational convenience so that we can refer to some of the same equations that arise in the dynamic model. 
17 If prices are different, then one country is richer than the other ex ante, a situation that contradicts symmetry. 
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but they may trade some of their shares with households in the other country, which implies constraint 
(2.7).  Given the symmetry in the model, there is home bias when 
1
2
f γ < . 
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Firms engage in monopolistic competition as in Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). A firm in this 
economy monopolistically produces a specific good indexed by   using a linear technology: i
18
  () () tt t Yi A Li = , (2.14) 
where   is the production of firm  ,  () t Yi i t A  is the country-specific technology parameter and   is 
the labor input of firm i . Labor is assumed to be homogeneous and to be supplied elastically. Home 
and Foreign markets are segmented, and only the producer can distribute its product. Firms set prices 
one period in advance in the consumers' currencies for each country. Firms in each country set prices 
so as to maximize their expected profits, taking other firms' prices as given, which is equivalent to 
taking the price level as given since each firm has measure zero on interval [0,1]. 
() t Li
Given the CES utility sub-function, the demand for Home good i  from the Home market 













λ ω − − ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞
=⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
, (2.15) 
                                                 
18 Using a Cobb-Douglas technology with other fixed inputs will not change the result if the returns on the other 
factors belong to the equity holders. 
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where ( ) t D i   is the stochastic discount factor for the firm i . For example, if firms are owned by Home 






. However, because firms are not always domestically owned, we use a more 
general notation. 
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Because firms are all alike, they will set the identical prices for each market. 
The market clearing condition can be obtained by equating the output with the sum of the 
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Given these prices, we can calculate profits. Using the optimal consumption allocations, we 
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Firms will pay out all of their profits as dividends. 
We assume that  t A  and 
*
t A   are drawn from identical lognormal distributions with 
() () ( ) ()
*
11 var ln var ln tttt AA
2
a σ −− == , and  ( ) *
*
1, , cov ln ln tt t aa AAσ − = . We also assume that  t M  a  
*
t nd M  
                                                 
19 We will omit index i since Home firms are identical. 
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drawn from identical lognormal distributions with  ( ) ( ) ( ) ()
*
11
2 ar ln var ln tt tt m MM v σ −− == are  , and 
   () *
*
1, , cov ln ln tt t mm MM σ − =
The labor market is competitive, and the wage moves freely to equate demand and supply of 
labor after the shocks. The output of each good is determined by demand. Firms adjust output after the 
shocks to satisfy demand, holding prices constant. The money market is assumed to equilibrate, so 
money demand equals money supply.    
 
2.3 Solution of the Static Model 
An equilibrium in the static model satisfies equations (2.2) and (2.5)-(2.21), and their foreign 
counterparts. These 39 equations (one is redundant by Walras' Law) solve for ,  , t C , ht C , f t C ,  , 
,  ,  ,  ,  , 
, () ht Ci
, () ft Ci t L t W t P , ht P , f t P ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  , () ht Pi
*
, () ht Pi () t Yi , () ht Yi
,
* ()
ht Yi t Π ,  h γ ,   f γ , and their foreign 
counterparts, and δ ,  t F , and  . t S
20
We will not in fact solve for this equilibrium, but will instead solve the equilibrium for a set 
of equations that approximate these 39. We take first-order approximations to the budget constraint 
(2.2), the definitions of the consumption and price indexes (2.3)-(2.6), the equilibrium condition 
(2.19), and the definition of profits (2.20)-(2.21).  Under our assumption that the driving variables are 
lognormally distributed, and with the log-linearization of these equations, we can solve equations 
(2.7)-(2.18) exactly.  By exactly solving the Euler equations (2.12)-(2.13), we have successfully 
integrated international portfolio choice into a sticky-price model. 
Our focus is on the equilibrium portfolio choice of equity shares and forward foreign 
exchange position. We proceed in this section to construct the equilibrium solutions for these 
variables in an intuitive manner. We will first derive the portfolio demands for households, taking 
prices as given. With these in hand, we will use equilibrium conditions in goods, labor, and asset 
markets to derive the equilibrium portfolio positions. 
We rely on ex ante symmetry in the derivations below. Lower-case letters refer to logs of 
their upper case counterparts. We use “var” to denote variance, and “cov” covariance.
21  We use the 
notation  () t x Ex = .  In the linearized equations below, we suppress the intercept terms for 
convenience.  
Under log-normality, the household first-order condition (2.12) can be written as 
 
1
cov( , ) var( ) 0
2
tt t cs s ρ −+ =
                                                
, (2.22) 
 
20 We have also implicitly assumed that there is a money market equilibrium condition, but we have not 
introduced separate notation for money demand and money supply and that there is a forward market clearing 
condition which can be guaranteed here by setting 
* F δ δ =  .  By symmetry in the static model, F equals one. 
21 We drop the   subscript on expectations for the rest of this section.  1 t−
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where we have used ex ante symmetry to give us  0 t f = , and  () 0 t Es = . 
We can use similar steps, and recognize that symmetry implies that 
* π π = , 
* var( ) var( ) tt π π = , 
and 
* cov( , ) cov( , ) tt tt ss π π =− , to derive from equation (2.13): 
  () (
* 1
cov , ( ) cov , ( ) 0
2




We approximate the budget constraint (2.2), using condition (2.7) to arrive at 
 


















, and  f γ γ ≡ .   Here, we have approximated the budget constraint 
around a point where  t x x =  for 
* ,,, , , tt t t t t t x sc wl ππ = . 
  We use equation (2.24) to substitute out for   in equations (2.22) and (2.23), and recognize 
that   is predetermined.  Using these equations, we solve out for 
t c
t p γ  and δ : 
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β ≡  
Consider expression (2.25). From the household’s point of view, the equity position is 
determined by the covariances and variances of shocks to profits and labor income that are orthogonal 
to exchange rates. Any variance in the portfolio that is attributable to exchange rate changes is hedged 
through the forward position, so the equity position is determined only by those risks that are 
uncorrelated with exchange rate risk. 
If the component of labor income that is orthogonal to exchange rates were uncorrelated with 
relative profits of Home and Foreign firms (or if labor’s share were zero), the second term in equation 
(2.25) would drop out. Then the share γ  of equities held in Foreign firms would increase as Home 
profits (orthogonal to the exchange rate) have a higher covariance with relative Home and Foreign 
profits. Under our symmetry assumption, this term will equal 1/2, so the portfolio would be balanced 
between Home and Foreign equities if only the first term mattered. It is the second term of equation 
(2.25) that will determine home bias. 
That term tells us that the share of Foreign equities will be larger the greater the covariance 
between wage income and Home profits relative to Foreign profits. If this covariance is positive, there 
will be anti-home bias (
1
2
γ > ), as in Baxter and Jermann (1997). In that case, returns to Home 
equities (compared to returns on Foreign equities) are positively correlated with labor income, so the 
  10 
variance of total income (returns to equities and human capital) is reduced by holding a relatively 
large share of Foreign equities. There is home bias when that covariance is negative. In that case, 
Home equities serve as a hedge against labor income shocks. 
So far, to arrive at equation (2.25), we have only used the households' first-order conditions 
and budget constraints, along with the symmetry assumption and the assumption that nominal prices 
are fixed. Now we can bring in one more equation from the rest of the economy, the linearization of 
the profit equation for Home firms. We have from (2.20) 
 
1
(1 ) ( )
2
W










  Taking covariances with 
*
t π π −  on both sides of equation (2.26), we get 
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where we have used symmetry to infer that 
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.   Substitute these relations into the right-hand side of (2.25) to derive 
0 γ = . 






=− + . (2.27) 
We find complete home bias in equity holdings,  0 γ = . Equation (2.25) indicates that the 
share of equities held in the foreign firm is determined by the covariance of the component of Home 
firm revenues (1 ) ( ) tt wl t ζ πζ −++  that is orthogonal to the exchange rate with the relative profits of 
Home to Foreign firms. If that covariance is zero, then no foreign equities are held. In that case, 
returns to Home equities are a perfect hedge for labor income. 
In fact, the residual from projecting (1 ) ( ) tt wl t ζ πζ − ++  on   is orthogonal to  t s
*
tt π π − . That 
is because equation (2.26) tells us that the revenue of the Home firm, (1 ) ( ) tt wl t ζ πζ −++ , is 
                                                 
22 In deriving (2.26), we use symmetry to get 
* cc =  and 
*
t pp t = .  The Appendix shows that  , 
which we have used to derive (2.26). 
0 ht t pp −=
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t c + t s . Output is demand determined. 
Demand depends on the overall level of consumption in both countries. Additionally, the Home-
currency revenue of the Home firm increases when the currency depreciates, because the depreciation 
increases the Home-currency value of Foreign sales. The projection residual is simply world 
consumption,  , and that is uncorrelated with relative profits by symmetry. 
W
t c




(1 ) ( ) ( )
22 2
tt t t t t tt t
W p cw l s p c s ζπ ζ
ρ ρ
+=− + ++ − =+ + .  
Using the definition of world consumption, this expression can be written as  
 
*
tt t cs c ρ ρ =+ . (2.28) 
This condition indicates that the linearized model replicates the equilibrium in which a full set of 
nominal contingent bonds is traded.  As is well known, in this case (and assuming symmetry), the 










Equation (2.28) takes the log of this condition, using symmetry to infer 
*
tt p p = .   The trading of 
Home and Foreign equities and forward contracts for foreign exchange are enough to deliver the same 
allocatio
inition of firm 
profits. 
nction. Other specifications that maintain equations (2.12) and (2.13) will 
deliver 
                                                
n as trading a full set of nominal contingent claims in the linearized economy.
23
We have derived the complete home bias result using only the nominal price stickiness 
assumption, the definition of Home profits, the budget constraint of Home households, and the two 
first-order conditions (2.12 and 2.13) that pertain to asset choice. (The derivations in this subsection 
all arise from equations (2.22), (2.23), (2.24), and (2.26), which are the approximated versions of the 
two first-order conditions for asset choice, the household budget constraint, and the def
In performing the approximations, we have used the fact that prices are preset.) 
We have not relied on other features of the model, so our home bias result is robust to 
alternative assumptions. For example, the result does not depend on money demand arising from real 
balances in the utility fu
the same result.  
As long as symmetry is maintained, the result does not depend on the assumptions about 
monetary policy.  In particular, we emphasize that our result does not depend on any assumption 
about the correlation of money shocks and productivity shocks.  The reason is that forward contracts 
 
23  Note the implication that the factor firms use in equations (2.17) and (2.18) to discount expected profits is 
identical (up to the linear approximation) for home and foreign households. 
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fully hedge monetary policy innovations, regardless of their correlation with innovations to 
technology.  That is because, as we show below, the exchange rate is determined by relative money 
supplies
om falling wages, or reduced 
hours, o
dings of money balances (and again using the fact that 
nominal prices are preset), is written as  
. 
The result also does not depend on our specification of the labor market as competitive with 
flexible wages. For example, a sticky-wage model in which employment was demand determined 
would not alter the conditions that we used in the derivation of the home-bias result.  The key point is 
that when nominal prices are set in advance, revenue earned by the firm does not depend on the 
realization of productivity.  The quantity produced by the firm is determined by demand, and the price 
is set in advance, so price times quantity does not respond to technology shocks.  Full hedging of 
technology shocks would then require households to hold only the domestic equity.  Any decline in 
employment income arising from productivity changes – whether it be fr
r some combination – is completely offset in profits to the firm. 
Further insights can be obtained from making use of some of the other equations of the model. 
Specifically, the first-order condition for hol
  tt mc ρ = . (2.29) 
Using this equation along with its foreign counterpart, and equation (2.28), we derive 
 
*
ttt s mm = − . (2.30) 
Exchan
shocks o
gs. The real 
effects 
 cur
ge rates are determined by relative money supplies. 
  The fact that equity demand depends only on the covariances after projecting on the 
exchange rate means that the equity portfolio is used only to hedge productivity shocks. Productivity 
shocks do not influence the amount of product the firm sells, which is demand determined in a sticky-
price model. Nor do productivity shocks affect the exchange rate, which influences firm revenue as 
well. So firm revenue depends only on monetary shocks. A positive productivity shock, for example, 
allows the firm to produce the quantity demanded with less labor. Both wages and employment fall in 
equilibrium. Profits increase by the exact amount of the drop in labor income. But the effect of those 
n household income is fully hedged when Home households hold 100 percent of Home firms. 
Monetary shocks have real consequences in this model. Indeed, equation (2.29) shows that in 
equilibrium, consumption is determined only by money supplies. As we have noted, productivity 
shocks only affect the distribution of revenues between labor income and profits, but in equilibrium, 
the effects of that redistribution is nullified by the complete home bias in equity holdin
of monetary shocks are hedged through the forward position in foreign exchange. 
Suppose, for example, that there is a negative Home monetary shock. In equilibrium, income 
of Home households falls because both labor and profit income fall. But the drop in the Home money 
supply also causes a home rency appreciation ( t s  declines.) The equilibrium value of δ  is negative, 
given our assumption of 1  ρ > . In this case, a decline in  t s  leads to a positive payoff from the forward 
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position. That is, when δ  is negative, the Home resident is short in foreign currency and long in home 
currency. So an appreciation yields a positive payoff, which hedges the effects of monetary shocks on 
labor an
mpletely eliminate the effects of monet
on income. From equation (2.26), we have that t
d profit income. 
Notice that the forward position does not co ary shocks 
(1 ) ( ) tt wl ζ πζ − ++  falls  by 
11
22 ρ
+  times  the 
decrease in   (because   falls by t m
W






t s  by 
1
2
.) Including returns from the forward position 
solved from equation (2.27), 
11
22 ρ
, we find that income still falls by  δ =−
1
ρ
 times the drop in  t m . 
Why? In this model, the Home and Foreign consumption markets are completely segmented. A 
change in the exchange rate causes a change in the relative prices paid by Home and Foreign 
households for identical goods, because nominal prices are set in advance in consumers’ currencies 
and do not respond to shocks. So Home prices rise relative to Foreign prices (expressed in a common 
currency) when  t s  falls. But households cannot trade goods to arbitrage the difference in goods prices. 
As is well known, when consumer products are not tradable, the efficient configuration of 
consumption (achievable when a full set of contingent nominal bonds is traded) has consumption 
levels lower in the Home country (relative to the Foreign country) in those states of the world in 
which its goods prices are higher than those in the Foreign country. That is why the equilibrium 
condition (2.29) does not achieve perfect consumption correlation. So with a negative Home monetary 
hock, ceteris paribus, Home income falls and Home consumption declines. 
. Dynamic Model 
 





In this section, we build an infinite-horizon model, which allows us to examine the effects of 
persistent technology shocks
 in the static model. 
The price-setting rule is modified as follows. A fraction τ  of firms in each country set prices 
in advance, and the rest of the firms can adjust their prices in each period after the realization of 
shocks. This approach allows us to study the portfolio allocation with or without sticky prices, and we 
can learn how different degrees of price stickiness affect the portfolio. There are different types of 
firms in each country but we assume the equities of all firms in each country are bundled together. 
We address two important questions here.  First, does price stickiness matter much for 
international portfolio choice?  In a world with temporary price stickiness and persistent productivity 
shocks, one might expect the answer is no.  But we will show that in fact a small amount of price 
stickiness may matter a lot.  Second, how do persistent shocks affect the optimal portfolio? In a 
  14 
flexible price setting, the optimal portfolio is more foreign skewed than it is in the classic endowment 
economy case, as shown in Baxter and  rmann (1997). This effect decreases the degree of home bias 
in our model as well. In the dynamic model, when the elasticity of substitution between Home and 
Foreign goods 
Je
is more than unity ( 1 ω > ), the optimal Home portfolio should be less home biased 
than it i
e have only equities and forward contacts. As shown in the 
ppendix, Home and Foreign equities and forward contracts span the linear space generated by 
rized economy. 
 
3.1 Household Problem 
ome households maximize their expected utility: 
s in the static model because households must take into account the future after prices have 
been adjusted. 
We have shown that we can integrate international portfolio choice into a monetary model by 
exactly solving the Euler equations as discussed in static model. Our model exhibits stationarity in the 
linearized economy by replicating the real-side allocations of a model with a full set of nominal 
contingent claims, although in our model w
A

















subject to the following budget constraint: 
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where  t Q ) denotes the price of Home (Foreign) equities. The utility function and consumption 
1 t
t Q  (
*
t   M −
, ht
, equities 
( γ , , f t γ ), and forward contracts  t δ . After the realization of shocks, households choose the 
consumption level, real money balances, and labor supply. The dividends from firms are paid at e 
households get the payoff from the forward contract. They receive the transfer from
 tim
 the 
governm nt as well. Finally, the households choose forward contracts 
t , and 
e 1 t δ +   and equity holdings  ,1 ht γ + , 
,1 f t γ + , which determine the dividends households receive at time  1 t + . 
  Our assumptions on consumption, asset acquisition, etc., follow exactly the standard 
presentation of the non-stochastic dynamic model (see, for example, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996)), 
with one exception:  We assume, as in the static model, that households can take a forward position in 
foreign exchange.  Making a contract to buy foreign exchange forward next period, of course, is 
equivalent to buying a nominal (non-state-contingent) bond denominated in the foreign currency and 
shorting a nominal bond denominated in the home currency.  We could have introduced nominal 
bonds denominated in each currency separately into the model, rather than forward contracts.   
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However, that would add nothing to our presentation.  We shall see below that the (linearized) model 
with equities and forward contracts reproduces the allocation that would be achieved with trade in a 
complete set of nominal state-contingent bonds.  So, if we introduced non-state-contingent nominal 
bonds i sition held by each household will exactly 
reproduce their position in the forward market. 
The first order conditions for the households are 
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∞
*
,1 ,1 th t tf t t VQS γγ ++ ≡+  
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+ ≡= − . (3.12) 
These are, respectively, financial wealth, human capital, the rate of return on financial wealth and 
human  r r algebraic convenience) and the share 
of foreign equity in equity portfolio. 
We can rewrite the budget constraint (3.1) for time 
capital (each multiplied by the utility discount facto  fo
t : 








PC V H V R V R H R
S
γβ γ β β δ
−− −
−
++ = − + + +   (3.13)  11 1 ( ) tt t t t t t t t t t t t t t S F −− − − .        
We will assume below a process for the money supply in which  ()
11
1 tt t E MM
−− = .  We note 



































= . The first order conditions for equity holdings, (3.5) and (3.6),  





















in each country. A fraction 
3.2 Firms 
Firms use the same linear technology as in the previous section. We have two types of f
τ  of firms set the price in advance, and the rest set the price after the 
realization of shocks. The profit maximization problem of the Home firm with price flexibility is 
**  
*
,, , , m a x( )( ) ( )( ( ) ( )
t
ht ht ht ht ht
W
Pi Yi i Y Yi Yi
⎞





⎡ ⎤ + + ⎟ − ⎜ ⎣ ⎦ . 
⎝⎠
Because is not a function of  , and  is not a function of  , the problem is easy 
to solve: 
 
  , () ht Yi  
*
, () ht Pi
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=≡ , (3.16) 
,, flex h t P  
can adjust prices aft
is the optimal price for the Home market of the Home goods produced by the firms that 
er they observe shocks. 
*
,, flex h t P  is the optimal price for the Foreign market. 
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where  D   is the stochastic discount factor, and   is the optimal price for the Home market at 
time t of the goods produced by the firms that set prices in advance. Now we can rewrite the price 
indexes as follows: 
















−− − ⎡ =− + ⎣⎤ ⎦ . (3.20) 
Since we have CES sub-utility functions, the market clearing condition can be obtained by 













ω ω − − ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞
=+ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
C . (3.21) 
While flexible-price firms will have higher profit than preset-price firms in general, CES sub-
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We assume that 
  ,            11
m




tt mm v + + =+, (3.24) 
  ,       11
WW
tW t t aa ϑ ++ =+
W v 1 1
R RR
tR t t aa v ϑ + + =+ , (3.25) 
where  [0,1] W ϑ ∈ ,  [0,1) R ϑ ∈ are degrees of persistence in world and relative technology levels and 
where  (
x




tt t x x =+ x t , and the relative variables as 
* R




tt Ev Ev m σ ++ == , so that 
1




− 2 as mentioned above.  We assume also 
* var( ) var( )
mm
m vv σ == , and 
,  *
*
, cov( , )
mm
mm vv σ =
2 var( )
W
W v σ = ,  
2 var( )
R
R v σ = , and cov( , ) 0
WR vv= . We assume initial symmetry 
between Home and Foreign: that is,  0 0
R a = , and  0 0
R m = .  Note in particular that we have not made 
any assumptions about the correlation of monetary shocks and productivity shocks.  As long as there 
is some independent component to the money shocks – that is, as long as the correlation between 
money and productivity shocks lies on the interval [0,1) – our results go through. 
 
3.3 Solution of the Dynamic Model 
Stationarity of solution
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To solve the model, we use approximations similar to those in the static model. The Appendix 
presents the solution to the model. There, the equilibrium is defined and solutions for all the 
endogenous variables are given. It shows that the equilibrium conditions are satisfied for those 
solutions. The derivation of the solution is extremely algebra intensive. Here we discuss the salient 
features of the solution. 
An important feature of the solution is that we are able to replicate the allocation achieved 
when a full set of state-contingent nominal bonds are traded in the linearly approximated model. We 
have two kinds of assets (equities and forward currency contracts) that span the space generated by 
R
t a  and 
R
t m . In that case, we have 
 
** () tt t t cc sp p ρ t − =+ −. (3.26) 
This equation is the familiar condition that arises when there is a full set of contingent claims but in 
which consumer price levels are not equal (see, for example, Chari, Kehoe and Mcgrattan (2002).) 
Pushing the time subscripts one period forward and taking expectations at time t , we get 
 
*
1 () ( tt tt 1 ) E cE c + + = . (3.27) 
This equation follows because prices are sticky for at most one period, so purchasing power parity 
holds in expectation. 
Equation (3.27) demonstrates a key sort of stationarity that emerges from our dynamic 
solution. Even though consumption levels might differ between Home and Foreign households at any 
time, looking forward they are always expected to be equal. That follows because, as we show in the 
Appendix (where ζ  is defined for the dynamic model), 
  (1 ) 0
RR
tt vh s ζζ t + −− = . (3.28) 
This equation means that relative total wealth, which is the sum of financial wealth and human capital, 
is equalized between Home and Foreign households. To be clear,   is defined as the value of equities 
that the Home household acquires at time t  and carries into period  1 t
t V
+ ,   t H  is the expected value 
at time t of returns to work from  1 t +  onward. So equation (3.28) says that the wealth levels of Home 
and Foreign households at the end of period t are equal. 
 and
This equality of wealth occurs even though in equilibrium Home and Foreign households hold 
different equity portfolios. Since the conditionally expected return on equities depends on the 
realization of shocks,  0
R
t v ≠  in general. That is, the conditional expectations of discounted payoffs on 
the Home and Foreign equity portfolios differ. In addition,  0
R
t h ≠ . The value of human capital for 
Home and Foreign households also depends on the realization of shocks, and so they are not in 
general equal. 
Why then is relative total wealth equal? Suppose there is a positive relative technology shock, 
, but no change in world productivity so that Home productivity rises and Foreign productivity  0
R
t a >
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falls. Hold monetary shocks equal to zero. In this case, we can show that neither Home nor Foreign 
consumption levels will be changed by the 
R
t a  shock in equilibrium, which is convenient for this 
example. 
Period t wage income of Home workers falls when prices are sufficiently sticky, and period t 
wage income of Foreign workers rises, as in the static model. The period t profits of Home firms rise 
and period t profits of Foreign firms fall. The current income of Home relative to Foreign might rise 
or fall. On the one hand, Home's relative labor income falls, but the profits Home households reap 
may be greater than that of Foreign households when there is home bias in equity holdings. 
Nonetheless, under the parameter configuration that delivers home bias, the overall income of Home 
falls relative to Foreign - the relative loss in wage income must outweigh any relative gain in profit 
income. 
But, in this situation in which home bias arises, the relative decline in current income for 
Home is precisely offset by the gains Home gets in the value of its human wealth and the gain in the 
value of the equities that it carries into period t. The positive realization of 
R
t a  pushes up   relative 
to   and   relative to  . Home's total wealth - the sum of the income it receives in period t from 
labor and profits, plus the value (after the realization of 
t Q
*




t a ) of the equity position it carries into 
period t, plus the value of its human wealth - is unchanged relative to Foreign. Since consumption 
levels are not affected by 
R
t a  shocks, the relative wealth of Home and Foreign at the end of period t is 
unchanged. 
Optimal portfolio
















,    (3.30) 
where 
11
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Λ≡ − + − + ⎢⎥ +− + − ⎣⎦
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.  Our 






FLEX γ  is the share of 
foreign assets in the portfolio when prices are fully flexible.   
  The share of the equity portfolio held in foreign assets, γ , is increasing in  , decreasing in 





γ < , we need
24
                                                 
24 We omit the case in which the denominator in equation (3.30) is non-positive: this case can happen only if the 
price is very flexible and  1 ω ≤ . 
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1( 1 ) 1
0









Notice that the condition (3.31) does not depend on ρ  or ζ , while ζ  determines the level of home 
bias.  There are intuitive explanations for how most of these parameters affect foreign equity demand. 
  As labor’s share, ζ , rises, γ  falls when there is home bias, and rises when there is anti-
home-bias.  The intuition is straightforward given our discussion above:  When the short-run effects 
that lead to a negative covariance of Home profits and labor income are sufficiently large that there is 
home bias, the home bias is amplified the larger is labor’s share.  The benefits from hedging labor 
income risk are greater when labor’s share is greater.  But when the long-run effects dominate, and 
returns to human capital are hedged by having a foreign-equity bias, the effect is again amplified the 
larger is labor’s share.  
  R βϑ  is, in a sense, a measure of the weight the future receives in the portfolio allocation 
decision.  R βϑ   is large when households place a high weight on the future, and when the relative 
productivity shocks have a very persistent influence.  In the extreme case when all prices are sticky 
( 1 τ = ) and the future does not matter ( 0 R βϑ = ), there is complete home bias ( 0 γ = .)  This actually 
is just the static model we examined previously – that assumed full price stickiness and placed no 
weight on the future. 







> . This outcome is similar to the theoretical result obtained by Baxter and Jermann 
(1997) – “the international diversification puzzle is worse than you think.” 
  γ  is decreasing in τ ,  when  1 ω >  -- increasing price stickiness leads to greater home bias in 
equity holdings. 
 When  1 ω > , an increase in  R βϑ  leads to an increase in Λ , which implies a greater share of 
Foreign equities in the Home household’s portfolio.  In short, the more the future “matters”, the larger 








. On the other hand, as  0 R βϑ → , the portfolio approaches 
1( 1 ) ( 1 )






+− − − τ
. This latter value is precisely the level γ   would take in the static 
model if a fraction τ  of prices were preset.   
  The values of home and foreign equities are determined by the expected present discounted 
value of current and future profits of the firms.  Would we not expect that the long run effects of 
productivity growth on dividend growth and labor income growth wash out any temporary effects 
from price stickiness?  Why would temporarily sticky prices matter so much?   
  21 
  The answer is that when goods prices adjust, terms of trade movements play an independent 
role in hedging consumption risk for households.  When the home country, for example, has a 
negative productivity shock, its export price rises because the supply of its good has diminished.  The 
increase in the relative price of its import tends to soften the blow from the negative productivity 
outcome.  Indeed, as Cole and Obstfeld (1991) point out, when the elasticity of substitution between 
home and foreign goods is unity ( 1 ω = ), the terms of trade movements provide complete 
consumption insurance without the need for any asset trade.
 25    
  The implication for portfolio choice is that the gains in households’ utility from diversifying 
their equity portfolios are reduced by the terms-of-trade effect.  So, while the optimal portfolio under 
flexible prices exhibits bias toward foreign equities, deviations from the optimal allocation may not 
impose much utility cost (and the cost goes to zero as ω  goes to one.)  But this insurance from terms 
of trade is not present when nominal prices are sticky.  Productivity shocks cannot change pre-set 
goods prices, and the exchange rate is determined in equilibrium by monetary shocks.  The equity 
portfolio must provide the hedge against productivity shocks when prices are sticky.  As the elasticity 
of substitution, ω , approaches unity, this effect will dominate any gains from hedging longer run 
risks. 
  In our model, a fraction τ  of the firms have set the price in advance for a single period.  The 
response of the cash flow of those firms to a relative productivity shock,  ˆ
R
t a , is given by Ω, defined 
above.  
  In the period that a shock occurs, a fraction 1 τ −  firms adjust their price freely.  The impact 










.  The period 
after the shock, all firms adjust their prices.  The expected discounted impact on cash flow from a 












.  Adding the initial-period effect 
to the long-run effect, we get the total effect of a one-unit change in  ˆ
R
t a  on the expected discounted 
cash-flow of firms that are adjusting their goods price to be Λ , defined above.  
  In these expressions, to be clear, the cash flow to sticky price firms refers to the one period 
during which the measure τ  firms have set prices in advance.  After the period in which the shocks 
occur, all firms are flexible-price firms.  Nonetheless, the response of cash flow among sticky price 
firms can be much larger than the discounted sum of cash flow to flexible-price firms.  For simplicity, 
if all firms were initially sticky price ( 1 τ = ), we see from these expressions that the impact of  ˆ
R
t a  on 







.  But the impact on the present 
                                                 
25   Heathcote and Perri (2004) assume  1 ω = , but assume that there is investment in capital and trade only in 
equities, and find that home bias can arise even with flexible goods prices. 
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Although the latter cash flow is enlarged because it represents the cash flow over an infinite horizon, 








, there are two other factors that work to make the effect on the cash 
flow after the initial period small relative to the initial-period effect.  First, under flexible prices the 
terms of trade changes dampen the effects of productivity shocks on firm revenues.  That channel 







 multiplies the cash flow in Λ , but 
not in Ω.  This works to reduce the effect of relative productivity shocks on Λ .
26  Second, in the 
initial period, firms do not “share” the benefit of the productivity increase with workers, so the initial 
effect when prices are sticky is multiplied by  /(1 ) ζζ − .  
  Formally, we can evaluate the effect of increasing price stickiness on the optimal portfolio, γ , 















The limit of this derivative as ω  approaches unity from above is negative infinity .  More generally, if 
the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is not too different than one, a small 
amount of price stickiness can have a large effect on the portfolio. In the next section, we use values 
of the parameters of this model from calibrated general equilibrium models in the literature and find 
that the amount of home bias implied by the model is considerable. 
 
3.4 Properties of the Model 
We can calibrate the amount of home bias implied by the model.  Although the model is not 
realistic enough to capture some features of the macroeconomy, it is still worthwhile to get a sense of 
the magnitude of home bias implied by the solution in equation (3.31). The share of the Home 
household’s equity portfolio held in foreign shares, γ , depends on the price stickiness parameter, τ ; 
labor's share, ζ ; the elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign aggregates, ω ; the discount 
factor, β ; the persistence of relative productivity shocks,  R ϑ ; and, the elasticity of labor supply, ψ . 
In most calibrations of new-Keynesian models with nominal price stickiness, the expected life 
of a nominal price (under Calvo price setting) is calibrated to be four quarters.
 27  However, evidence 
produced by Bils and Klenow (2004) suggests that the average life of a price is closer to two quarters.  
We will consider both calibrations.  In our model, a measure τ  of firms set prices for one period, and 
                                                 
26  This could increase the effect of relative productivity shocks on FL in the empirically implausible case that 
1 ψ <  and  2/( 1 ) ω ψ >− . 
27   Taylor (1999) is usually cited as a source for this calibration.  See for example Huang and Liu (2005),  
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a measure 1 τ −  adjust prices instantaneously.  So the expected life of a price is τ  periods.  We set 
0.8 τ = , on the grounds that perhaps 20% of firms adjust prices freely.  These firms produce “raw 
products” in the terminology of Bils and Klenow – fresh foods, gasoline, etc.  The share of these firms 
is certainly less than 20% using Bils and Klenows’ classification.  But we choose a higher value 
because it biases the results against being able to explain home bias.  That is, given the average life of 
prices, the more flexible price firms (the smaller is τ ), the more home bias.  With  0.8 τ = , a period is 
equal to five quarters if the average life of a price is 4 quarters, and is equal to 2.5 quarters if the 
average lifespan of a price is two quarters.   
Following Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992), we set  23 ζ = .  The estimates of Backus, 
Kehoe and Kydland (1992) give us on quarterly data that the autocorrelation of relative productivity 
shocks is 0.855, so we set   using the standard calibration for price adjustment, 
or    if the period of price adjustment is shorter.  Likewise, the quarterly 
discount factor in Backus et al. is 0.99, so we take   or  .  We 
follow Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994), and Chari, Kehoe and Mcgrattan (2002) and set 
5 (0.855) 0.457 R ϑ =≈
2.5 (0.855) 0.676 R ϑ =≈
5 (0.99) 0.951 β =≈
2.5 (0.99) 0.975 β =≈
1.5 ω = .  
We follow Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002), and Bergin (2004) and set  1 ψ = . 
With these parameters, we find  0.24 γ ≈ , or  0.41 γ ≈   when we assume speedier price 
adjustment.  The model is symmetric between Home and Foreign countries, so an unbiased portfolio 
would be  0.5 γ = .   Under the standard calibration of price stickiness, the model predicts substantial 
home bias.  Even with the assumption of more rapid price adjustment – expected life of a price equal 
to two quarters – we find home bias in equities.  This finding should be compared to the prediction of 
the flexible-price model, which has strong anti-home bias of Baxter and Jermann (1997) with 
.  Just a small amount of price stickiness substantially changes the optimal portfolio, 
moving it in the direction of holding a greater share of home equities.   
1.5
FLEX γ =
The ratio of the sticky-price portfolio share to the flexible-price portfolio share of foreign 
equities,  /
FLEX γγ  depends on the elasticity of substitution, ω , as we have emphasized.  When we use 
the standard parametrization of  1.5 ω = ,  /
FLEX γγ  is equal to 0.16 when the average life of a price is 4 
quarters, and 0.27 when the average life is 2 quarters.  The corresponding ratios when  3 ω =  are 0.39 
and 0.55.  As ω  increases,  /
FLEX γγ  rises, but it remains less than one – price stickiness reduces home 
bias.  
We now examine some other dimensions of our model.  In our model, negative conditional 
correlation between labor hours and productivity conditioning on productivity shock is the key driving 
force for home bias. However, because households can hedge demand shock through forward 
contracts, the unconditional correlation can be positive. It is important to distinguish between 
conditional and unconditional correlation in our model. 
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Gali (1999) has noted that real business cycle models tend to imply a positive correlation 
between hours and productivity.  He shows in a simple closed-economy New Keynesian 
macroeconomic model that there is a negative correlation between hours and output per worker when 
there is a productivity shock.  The reasoning is much the same as that in our model. 
Gali goes on to derive empirical support for this implication of sticky-price models.  He 
estimates a structural bivariate VAR on total labor hours and labor productivity using U.S. data.
28  
The model was estimated on quarterly data from 1948:I to 1994:IV. There are two types of shocks in 
the model, which Gali classifies as technology shocks and non-technology shocks.  The non-
technology shocks can be associated with aggregate demand shocks.  Under his identification scheme, 
only technology shocks can permanently increase labor productivity. 
Gali finds that the conditional correlation between labor hours and productivity is negative for 
technology shocks, while the unconditional correlation is positive.  Rotemberg (2003) finds similar 
results.  If prices were flexible, in traditional real business cycle models, the correlation conditional on 
technology shocks would be positive - as it is in our model in the long run. 
Gali’s findings have not gone unchallenged.
29  Christiano, Eichenbum and Vigfusson (2003) 
substitute labor hours per capita for Gali’s total labor hours and reverse Gali’s finding on the 
conditional correlation.  However, Francis and Ramey (2005a) use the same measure, but 
quadratically detrended, and find the negative correlation between hours per capita and productivity 
conditional on technology shocks.  Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2003) find a similar result, using 
first-differences in hours per capita.  Francis and Ramey (2005b) create a new measure of hours per 
capita and confirm that a positive technology shock will reduce labor hours in the short run.  While 
there is no consensus yet on the sign of the conditional correlation, there is some significant empirical 
support for the contention that it is negative. 
Home bias does not require that the unconditional correlation of returns to human capital and 
returns to domestic equity be positive for two reasons:  First, as we note above, productivity shocks 
may have a low variance relative to monetary shocks, but it is the covariance holding monetary 
shocks constant that matters for home bias.  Second, it is the correlation of returns to human capital 
with the relative Home to Foreign equity returns that matters for productivity.  If Home and Foreign 
productivity shocks are highly correlated, there may be home bias even when the conditional 
correlation of human capital returns and domestic equity returns is high.  This is illustrated in Tables 2 
and 3.  Here, we use the parameter values from our two experiments above in which the average life 
of a price was 4 quarters and 2 quarters. In addition, we set the coefficient of relative risk aversion, ρ , 
equal to two, and we assume the world productivity shock is permanent,  1.0 W ϑ = .   
                                                 
28 He also uses employment instead of labor hours, and finds the same result holds for all G7 countries except 
Japan. 
29 See Gali and Rabanal (2005) for details. 
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Table 2 presents the correlation of returns on human capital with returns to domestic equities.  
The correlation is calculated under alternative assumptions about the correlation of innovations to 
home and foreign productivity, and alternative assumptions about the standard deviation of 
productivity innovations relative to money supply innovations. There is a positive correlation of 
returns to human capital and Home equities in all cases.  The correlations reported in this table (and 
Table 3) are under the assumption that home and foreign monetary innovations are uncorrelated, but 
we find that the return correlations are virtually unchanged if we raise the money correlations to 0.5. 
Table 3 presents the correlation of returns on human capital with returns to domestic equities 
relative to foreign equities.  Even here, we see that the correlations are positive unless the variance of 
productivity shocks is quite large relative to the variance of monetary shocks.  What is a reasonable 
value for these relative variances?  Gali and Rabanal (2004) provide one measure.  They estimate a 
simple VAR using US data on hours and output in the non-farm sector.  According to their measure, 
the ratio of the standard deviation of the home productivity shock to the home monetary shock is 
1.12.
30    We see from table 3 that when the standard deviations of the two shocks are approximately 
equal, the model implies a positive correlation between the returns to human capital and the return to 
domestic equities relative to foreign equities.   
Table 4 reports some other correlations implied by the model.  Table 4a refers to the case of 
average price duration of 4 quarters, and Table 4b to the case of 2-quarter duration.  The top panel in 
each table reports the correlation of changes in logs of home and foreign consumption, the second 
panel is the correlation of changes in logs of home and foreign output, and the third is the correlation 
of changes in home consumption and output.  These correlations are reported under various 
assumptions about the correlation of innovations in productivity shocks and the standard deviation of 
productivity shocks relative to monetary shocks (as in Tables 2 and 3).   
Backus, Kydland, and Kehoe (1992) report for example that the correlation of US and 
European consumption is 0.46 and output is 0.70.  They report a correlation of US consumption with 
US output of 0.76.  (All of these are using Hodrick-Prescott detrending.)  The numbers that we report 
in Table 4 are roughly in this range.  For example in Table 4a, when we assume equal volatility of 
productivity and monetary innovations (as Gali and Rabanal find), and when home and foreign 
productivity innovations have a correlation of 0.75, then we find the correlation of home and foreign 
consumption growth is 0.39, the correlation of home and foreign output growth is 0.80, and the 
correlation of home consumption and output growth is 0.79.  When prices are assumed to be sticky for 
a shorter period of time (Table 4b), the corresponding correlations are 0.39 for home-foreign 
consumption growth, 0.72 for home-foreign output growth, and 0.78 for home consumption-output 
growth.
31   
                                                 
30   These variances are not reported in the paper, but were kindly provided to us by Pau Rabanal. 
31 Note that in Backus, Kydland, and Kehoe, the reported correlation of shocks is closer to 0.25, rather than 0.75.  
All of the correlations are a bit lower in that case.  However, we should not rely on BKK’s estimate of this 
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In both the static and dynamic models, the allocation in the linearly approximated model 
replicates the one achieved when a full set of state-contingent bonds is traded. This is in a sense a 
shortcoming of our model since this allocation leaves other puzzles unsolved – the high volatility of 
the observed exchange rate or the consumption-real exchange rate anomaly as described in Chari et al. 
(2002).   
One possible way of extending our model may help to explain the anomalous behavior of real 
exchange rates and consumption, while maintaining our mechanism for home bias.  Julliard (2004) 
argues, in a partial-equilibrium setting, that credit constraints (specifically, a constraint that prevents 
short selling of equities or bonds), may lead to substantial home bias when returns to human capital 
and relative equity returns are negatively correlated.  His argument is that unconstrained households 
would prefer a portfolio weighted toward home equities for reasons similar to the ones discussed in 
this paper (though he takes as given the source of this negative correlation, rather than deriving it 
from a model.)  Credit constrained households would like to go short in some assets.  During the life-
cycle of these households, they may move to a position in which they hold positive amounts of 
equities.  Julliard demonstrates that these households that are just emerging from the credit constraint 
have a strong incentive to diversify their labor income risk, which they would do by acquiring a 
portfolio that is strongly biased toward domestic equities. 
If such a model were to be embedded into a general equilibrium framework, the very tight 
link between the real exchange rate and relative consumption levels implied by our model would be 
broken.  However, such a model would be very much more difficult to solve (even numerically) and it 
is unlikely that one could obtain a closed-form solution for the foreign equity share such as our 
equation (3.30). 
  Finally, our model implies that home bias arises because domestic equities provide a hedge 
for labor income.  There is some evidence that bears out this source of home bias.  Our evidence 
comes from the Survey of Consumer Finances 2001 public data, reported by the Federal Reserve 
Board.  In Table 5 we report the results of regressions of a household’s equity share in their portfolio 
on the share of their income derived from labor income.  To measure labor’s share, we simply divide 
income reported from wages and salaries by the sum of income from all sources.  We eliminate 
observations that do not lie between zero and one.  Table 5 reports results for three different measures 
of the dependent variable.  The first uses the value of foreign stocks directly held by households 
divided by the value of all stocks held by households.  The second takes the value of foreign stocks 
divided by equity held by households (which is the sum of stocks, stock portfolio mutual funds and 
50% of mixed portfolio mutual funds held by households.)  The third takes the value of stocks divided 
by the total financial wealth held by households.  In all cases, we report a negative coefficient on 
                                                                                                                                                        
correlation because it comes from a model in which output is driven only from technology shocks.  Further 
empirical investigation of our model is required. 
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labor income, as our model predicts: as labor income increases as a share of household income, home 
bias increases.  In the second and third regression, the coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Our model provides a general equilibrium analysis of the factors that determine equilibrium 
portfolio choice in a dynamic setting.  Sticky-price portfolio balance models have been a staple of 
open-economy macroeconomics for decades, but until now there was no fully integrated dynamic 
stochastic equilibrium model.  Our model is, we believe, a starting point.  We are able to solve the 
model in closed form, and therefore we can provide some novel insights into the interplay between 
financial markets and the macroeconomy. 
We have stressed a few of these features.  First, we have demonstrated that even a small 
amount of nominal rigidity – price setting with a relatively short duration – can dramatically alter 
equilibrium equity portfolios.  Second, our model shows clearly how the different roles of monetary 
shocks and productivity shocks in determining equity portfolios and bond portfolios (or the position in 
the market for forward foreign exchange.)  And, our model provides an interesting new mechanism 
that may help explain some of the home bias in equity portfolios. 
Although our model provides a theoretical foundation for home bias, we believe other factors, 
such as information costs, play important roles. The economic forces that lead to home bias in our 
model do not require the exclusion of other considerations that have been raised in the literature.  We 
have not built a model that is intended to explain home bias, because it does not include any features 
that are designed explicitly to deliver home bias.  Instead, we have found that home bias is a natural 
outcome in a symmetric model in which output is demand determined to some extent and claims to 
labor income are not traded.  The model can be solved analytically in a straightforward way, and 
extensions of this framework may prove useful in examining other questions in international finance, 
such as the role of valuation effects in external adjustment; the effects of portfolio adjustment on 
macroeconomic and current account adjustment, the relationship between movements in stock prices 
and exchange rates, etc. 
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Appendix 
 
A. Solution of the Dynamic Model 
 
An equilibrium satisfies the first order conditions, budget constraint and market clearing 
conditions. First we define an equilibrium formally. Then we will list the linearized first order 
conditions and redefine equilibrium in linearized form.  
Definition A 
An equilibrium is a set of sequences
32    ... . , , {,,,,, , , ( ) , ( ) , , ttt t th tf th t f t f l e x h t CLW C C C iC iP δγ 
,, ,, ,, , , , , 1 ,,, , , , , , , , , , ,
H } fl e x f tp r e s e t h tp r e s e t h tth tf ttt ttt th tf t t P PPP P P Q V H R R γγ
∞
= Π  and their foreign counterparts and 
, which solves the system of 50 equations {,} tt SF
33 consisting of (2.5), (2.8), (2.9), (3.3), (3.4), (3.7)-
(3.22), and their foreign counterparts plus 3 asset markets clearing conditions,
34 given stochastic 
sequences 
* {, , , } tt t t
* A AMM  and initial conditions 
*
00 A A =  , 
*
00 M M = ,  0 0 γ = , and   
*
0 0. γ =
 
A.1 Approximated System 
In this section, we derive a log-linear version of the model, under the assumption that the 
stochastic driving variables (productivity and money) are lognormally distributed.  Many of the 
equations of the model are linear in logs (without any approximation).  But some of the equations in 
the model (the budget constraint for households, the definition of profits for the firms, and the market 
clearing conditions) are log-linearized around unconditional means.  It is immediately apparent that 
our assumptions of stationary productivity processes and unit-root monetary processes imply that 
nominal variables have unit roots and real variables are stationary.  So we log-linearize around the 
unconditional means of real variables.
35
In some of the log-linearized equations below, the algebra is simplified considerably if we use 
the result that  0 h pp −=.  (In our notation, x  represents the unconditional mean of  t x .)  While we 
could proceed with the derivations without using this result, and then verify in the solutions that this 
result is true, it is easier to demonstrate this first and use it in some of the log-linearizations. 
First, in the definition of profits for the home firm, divide both sides of equation (3.22) by  , 
then evaluate the equation at the point of expansion for the log-linearziation: 
t P
  () ( )
** 11
exp( ) exp( ) exp (1 )( ) exp (1 )( ) exp( )
22
hh p cp p p p w πω ω ⎡⎤ −= − − + − − − − + ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
p l
                                                
. 
 
32 There are 24×2+2 variables. 
33 The number of equations should be 51, but one is redundant by Walras’ Law. 
34  ,  , and 
*
,, 1 ht ht γγ +=
*
,, 1 ft ft γγ +=
*
tt t Fδ δ =  .  
35 We could easily accommodate unit-root processes in productivity.  Then real variables expressed in 
“efficiency units” would be stationary.  However, there is no real gain from this generalization, so we maintain 
stationary productivity shocks to simplify the algebra. 
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Here we have used symmetry to give us 
* cc =  and 
* 0 sp p + −=.   
  Divide the budget constraint (3.1) by  , then evaluate the equation at the point of expansion 
for the log-linearization:  
t P
  exp( ) exp( ) exp( ) p cw p π −= − − + l . 
In deriving this expression, we have used symmetry to give us  
* 0 sq q + −=,  
* 0 s ππ +− = , and 
0 sf −=.  We have also used  ,, 1 ft h t γ γ +=  and  1 tt t M MT − r = + . 
  Now comparing the two equations we have derived, we must have  
  () ()
** 11
exp (1 )( ) exp (1 )( ) 1
22
hh pp pp ωω −− + −− = . 
This can be written as  
() ()
11
exp (1 )( ) exp (1 )( ) 1
22
hh pp pp ωω −− +− −− = ,  
where we have used symmetry to give us that 
**
hf p ppp − =− , and linearized (2.5) to get 
( hf ) p pp p −= − − .  It then follows that  0 h pp − = , which is the result we will use below to simplify 
some of the log-linearizations. 
A few more notational conventions: We denote ˆt x   as the deviation from the conditional 





tt t x x ≡+ x t  and the relative variables as 
* R
tt x xx ≡ − . 
 
A.1.1 The first order conditions for households 
Suppressing constant terms and taking logs, the first order condition for consumption (3.14) 
can be written as  
 
1
( tt cm p
ρ
=− ) . t
t
 (A.1) 
Using equation (A.1), equation (3.3) can be expressed as  
  . tt lm w ψ = −+  (A.2) 
Some of the equations of the model are log-linear (such as (A.1) and (A.2)), and therefore, in 
the presence of lognormal distributions, offer exact solutions.  But others (such as the budget 
constraint, the market clearing condition, and the expression for a firm’s profits) require 
approximations.  Because all shocks are lognormal, the solution of the approximated model will take 
on a lognormal distribution.   We can use equation (3.14) to express (3.4) as  
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A.1.2 The budget constraint 
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.  In deriving this expression, we 
have used the fact that by symmetry, vpqp −=−, and then use equation (3.7) to derive 








.  Similarly, from equation (3.9), we get 







.  Then, evaluating the budget constraint at the point of expansion, 
we have exp( ) exp( ) exp( ) cw p lπ =− + + .  
 
A.1.3 The first order conditions for firms 
Firms set their prices optimally. The first order conditions can be written as  
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Note that the conditional second moments in (A.9) and (A.10) are all constant over time, and will be 
treated as constant terms in subsequent linearizations. 
Thus, the prices of each category of goods (3.19 and 3.20) can be expressed as following: 
  ,, , (1 ) ht p r e s e tht f l e xht pp p τ τ =+ − , (A.11) 
  ,, , (1 ) , , f t preset f t flex f t pp p τ τ =+ − . (A.12) 
Combining these two and suppressing the constants, we get the expression for price index: 
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.1.4  Goods market clearing 
ng condition, equation (3.21) can be linearized as 
A
The goods market cleari
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A.1.5  Other definitions 
udget constraint (3.13), we introduced human capital.  Linearizing (3.9) 
gives us
−++− − + − . (A.14) 
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.2 Definition of Approximated Equilibrium 
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A.3 Equilibrium Allocation 
 following allocation is an equilibrium.  We conjecture that the
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Notice that this allocation replicates the allocation when a full set of state-contingent bonds is 
traded: 
 
** () tt t t cc sp p ρ − =+ −. (A.38) 
 
A.4 Proof 
We will show this allocation satisfies the equilibrium conditions. 
 
A.4.1 Fundamental Variables 
We now prove that the first order conditions for fundamental variables and labor market 
clearing conditions are in fact satisfied. 
It is immediate to confirm that equations (A.18) – (A.21) satisfy equation (A.2).  Likewise it 
is straightforward to check that (A.22) – (A.25) satisfy (A.1). 
We can also verify that (A.18), (A.20) and (A.26) satisfy the relative version of the labor 
market clearing condition (A.14): 
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It is tedious but straightforward to verify that (A.19) and (A.21) satisfy the world version of 
labor market clearing condition (A.14): 
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are satisfied.  Note that the variance and covariance terms in (A.9) and (A.10) are constant, from the 
solutions above.  Substituting equations (A.7) – (A.12) into (A.13), and suppressing constant terms, 
we see that (A.37) and (A.38) are the solutions to the world and relative versions of (A.13). 
So far, we have proved equations (A.1), (A.2), (A.13), and (A.14) are satisfied. 
 
A.4.2 Returns on assets 
In order to show that this allocation in fact satisfies the first order conditions for asset 
holdings, we want to calculate the rate of return on assets – human capital and equities. 
Since 
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Subtracting the foreign counterpart, we get equation (A.30).  Adding the foreign counterpart 
gives us the solution to  . 
W H
t r
Following similar step as in the return on human capital, we get the return on equity: 
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Subtracting the foreign counterpart, we get (A.28), and adding the foreign counterpart gives us that 




A.4.3 Asset Allocation 
Since we replicate complete markets, these allocations should satisfy the first order conditions 
for the asset allocation as expressed in equations (3.4) and (3.15). We will prove that linearized 
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version of them (A.3) – (A.4) are satisfied.  From (A.26) and (A.27), we see  1 tt t f Es − = .  So, for 
equation (A.3) to be satisfied, we need 
   (A.45)  1 cov ( , ) var ( ),
R
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tt s m = . 
  Since from (A.28) and (A.29),   is i.i.d., we have  t r 1 (( ) tt t t Er mm − 1 ) − − −  is constant.  Likewise, 
using (A.26),   is constant.  We can solve directly for these expectations 
from equations (A.4) and (A.5), using the covariances and variances implied by our solution in (A.18) 
– (A.33).  But the following restriction links (A.4) and (A.5):  
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We utilize orthogonality between world shocks and relative shocks to simplify the first term: 
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         (A.49) 
We confirm that this allocation in fact satisfies the first order conditions for asset allocations.  
So (A.3) – (A.5) are satisfied. 
 
A4.4  Human Wealth 
 
  To verify that (A.34) and (A.35) provide the solution for human wealth (A.15), we use (A.18) 
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Then subtracting the foreign counterpart of (A.50), we get (A.34), and adding the foreign counterpart 
gives us (A.35). 
 
A.4.5 Budget Constraint 
  
First, world budget constraint expressed in home currency is the following: 
  1
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where we have used 
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tt γ γ = .  We have also used 
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*
tt δ δ = .  
This requires some explanation.  The home currency earnings, expressed in home currency, from the 
forward market are  .  That means that the foreign currency earnings for the foreign country 
are 
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where we have used (A.27), and 
* mpm p −= −
*  and 
* cc = . 
The world budget constraint holds with any realization of   and   since equation (A.51) 
simply indicates that total world wealth carried over into the next period is equal to the value of 
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both sides of the equation are the sum of future consumption. 
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Direct substitution from the solutions verifies this equation, but it is helpful to break this 
down into steps.   
Using 
*
tt γ γγ ==, and the solutions for 
R
t c , 
R
t p , and  t s , we can write  
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Using relative returns (A.28) – (A.31), we get  
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By substituting expressions for  t δ  and  t γ  from (A.32) and (A.33). into (A.56), we get  
  11 (1 ) (1 ) 1
R RR R R R
tt t t t vh m v h m βζ ζ ζ ζ t − − ⎡⎤ −+ − = − +− ⎣⎦ − . (A.57) 
 
But (A.34) and (A.36) give us 
  , (A.58)  (1 ) 0
RR R
tt t vh m ζζ −+ − =
so (A.57) holds.   
  We have verified that equations (A.1)-(A.6) and (A.14)-(A.17) are satisfied.
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Table 1 – List of Notation 
β   Discount factor 
ρ   Risk aversion parameter 
χ   Real balance parameter 
ψ   Labor supply parameter 
ω   Elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign goods 
λ   Elasticity of substitution among Home goods and Foreign goods 
, R W ϑ ϑ   Persistence of the technology shocks 
ζ   Labor’s share in national income 
h γ   Home equity share in the equity portfolio 
f γ γ =   Foreign equity share in the equity portfolio 
δ    Number of forward contracts 
δ   Normalized number of forward contracts 
τ   Ratio of firms setting price in advance in the dynamic model 
t Π   Nominal profit of Home firms = dividend 
t A   Productivity 
t C   Consumption basket 
, ht C   Consumption aggregate of Home-produced goods 
, f t C   Consumption aggregate of Foreign-produced goods 
, () ht Ci   Consumption of Home-produced good of variety i 
, () ft Ci   Consumption of Foreign-produced good of variety i 
t F   Forward rate for delivery at time t (set at t – 1) 
t H   Value of human capital  
t L   Employment 
t M   Money balances 
t P   Price of consumption basket 
, ht P   Price of consumption aggregate of Home-produced goods 
, f t P   Price of consumption aggregate of Foreign-produced goods 
, () ht Pi   Price of consumption of Home-produced good of variety i 
, () ft Pi   Price of consumption of Foreign-produced good of variety i 
t Q   Price of home equity 
t R   Return on home equity 
H
t R   Return on human capital 
t S   Nominal exchange rate  
t Tr   Transfer from government 
t V   Value of equity portfolio 
t W   Nominal wage rate 
t Y   Output of Home goods 
 
  1 
Table 2 
 
Correlation of Returns on Home Equities with Returns to Human Capital 
 
Average duration of 4 quarters
Standard Deviation of Productivity Shock Relative to Monetary Shock
corr(a,a*) 0.01 0.5 1 2 4 8 100
0 0.985 0.970 0.934 0.855 0.773 0.734 0.717
0.25 0.985 0.971 0.939 0.879 0.833 0.816 0.811
0.5 0.985 0.972 0.944 0.902 0.883 0.884 0.886
0.75 0.985 0.973 0.949 0.924 0.928 0.940 0.948
0.99 0.985 0.974 0.954 0.943 0.966 0.987 0.998
Average duration of 2 quarters
Standard Deviation of Productivity Shock Relative to Monetary Shock
corr(a,a*) 0.01 0.5 1 2 4 8 100
0 0.996 0.993 0.984 0.968 0.954 0.949 0.947
0.25 0.996 0.993 0.986 0.974 0.968 0.968 0.968
0.5 0.996 0.993 0.987 0.980 0.979 0.981 0.982
0.75 0.996 0.994 0.989 0.985 0.988 0.991 0.992
0.99 0.996 0.994 0.990 0.989 0.995 0.998 1.000 
 
 
Notes:  Numbers on the left-hand-column refer to the correlation between innovations in home and foreign 
productivity,   and  .  Numbers along the top row are the standard deviation of innovations in productivity 
relative to the standard deviation of innovations to the money supplies.  The numbers reported in the tables are 
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Table 3 
 
Correlation of Relative Returns on Equities with Returns to Human Capital 
 
Average duration of 4 quarters
Standard Deviation of Productivity Shock Relative to Monetary Shock
corr(a,a*) 0 . 0 1 0 . 51248
0 0.683 0.651 0.572 0.378 0.125 -0.039 -0.123
0.25 0.683 0.649 0.565 0.376 0.142 -0.012 -0.095
0.5 0.683 0.646 0.560 0.377 0.162 0.016 -0.071
0.75 0.683 0.644 0.555 0.380 0.187 0.052 -0.046
0.99 0.683 0.641 0.551 0.384 0.219 0.111 -0.005
Average duration of 2 quarters
Standard Deviation of Productivity Shock Relative to Monetary Shock
corr(a,a*) 0 . 0 1 0 . 51248
0 0.695 0.672 0.613 0.464 0.247 0.068 -0.067
0.25 0.695 0.667 0.600 0.444 0.239 0.078 -0.051
0.5 0.695 0.663 0.589 0.428 0.235 0.089 -0.038
0.75 0.695 0.659 0.578 0.415 0.233 0.103 -0.024





Notes:  Numbers on the left-hand-column refer to the correlation between innovations in home and foreign 
productivity,   and  .  Numbers along the top row are the standard deviation of innovations in productivity 
relative to the standard deviation of innovations to the money supplies.  The numbers reported in the tables are 
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Table 4a 
 
Correlations of Real Variables 
 
Average duration of 4 quarters
correlation between home and foreign consumption growth 
Standard Deviation of Technology Shocks Relative to Monetary Shocks
corr(a,a*) 0 . 0 1 0 . 51248 1 0 0
0.00 -0.095 0.018 0.249 0.614 0.869 0.964 1.000
0.25 -0.095 0.042 0.304 0.668 0.892 0.971 1.000
0.50 -0.095 0.066 0.351 0.708 0.909 0.976 1.000
0.75 -0.095 0.088 0.393 0.740 0.921 0.979 1.000
0.99 -0.095 0.108 0.428 0.765 0.930 0.982 1.000
correlation between home and foreign output growth 
Standard Deviation of Technology Shocks Relative to Monetary Shocks
corr(a,a*) 0 . 0 1 0 . 51248 1 0 0
0.00 1.000 0.599 0.231 0.002 -0.078 -0.100 -0.107
0.25 1.000 0.696 0.412 0.233 0.170 0.153 0.147
0.50 1.000 0.795 0.601 0.476 0.431 0.419 0.415
0.75 1.000 0.897 0.796 0.731 0.708 0.701 0.699
0.99 1.000 0.996 0.992 0.989 0.988 0.988 0.988
correlation between home consumption and output growth 
Standard Deviation of Technology Shocks Relative to Monetary Shocks
corr(a,a*) 0 . 0 1 0 . 51248 1 0 0
0.00 0.673 0.638 0.620 0.636 0.656 0.665 0.668
0.25 0.673 0.665 0.679 0.717 0.744 0.754 0.757
0.50 0.673 0.692 0.735 0.794 0.826 0.837 0.841
0.75 0.673 0.718 0.791 0.868 0.906 0.917 0.922
0.99 0.673 0.744 0.843 0.937 0.979 0.992 0.997  
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Table 4b 
 
Correlations of Real Variables 
Average duration of 2 quarters
correlation between home and foreign consumption growth 
Standard Deviation of Technology Shocks Relative to Monetary Shocks
corr(a,a*) 0 . 0 1 0 . 51248
0.00 -0.095 0.018 0.249 0.614 0.869 0.964 1.000
0.25 -0.095 0.042 0.304 0.668 0.892 0.971 1.000
0.50 -0.095 0.066 0.351 0.708 0.909 0.976 1.000
0.75 -0.095 0.088 0.393 0.740 0.921 0.979 1.000
0.99 -0.095 0.108 0.428 0.765 0.930 0.982 1.000
correlation between home and foreign output growth 
Standard Deviation of Technology Shocks Relative to Monetary Shocks
corr(a,a*) 0 . 0 1 0 . 51248
0.00 1.000 0.483 0.070 -0.161 -0.238 -0.259 -0.266
0.25 1.000 0.601 0.267 0.073 0.007 -0.011 -0.017
0.50 1.000 0.727 0.485 0.339 0.288 0.275 0.270
0.75 1.000 0.859 0.728 0.645 0.615 0.607 0.605
0.99 1.000 0.994 0.988 0.985 0.983 0.983 0.983
correlation between home consumption and output growth 
Standard Deviation of Technology Shocks Relative to Monetary Shocks
corr(a,a*) 0 . 0 1 0 . 51248
0.00 0.673 0.614 0.578 0.582 0.597 0.603 0.606
0.25 0.673 0.646 0.643 0.669 0.690 0.698 0.701
0.50 0.673 0.678 0.708 0.756 0.784 0.793 0.797
0.75 0.673 0.711 0.776 0.846 0.881 0.892 0.896













Dependent Variable  Slope  Intercept 
  
Foreign 
Stocks/STOCK coeffcient  -0.00322 0.018641
 adj  std  0.004019 0.003227
Foreign 
Stocks/EQUITY coeffcient  -0.00445 0.01137
 adj  std  0.002467 0.001981
  
Foreign Stocks/FIN  coeffcient  -0.00314 0.00688
 adj  std  0.00151 0.001213
 
Notes: # of observation 22210/5. There are 5 replicated samples for each sample. We report OLS standard errors 
adjusted as suggested by the Survey of Consumer Finance, by multiplying unadjusted standard deviation by 
square root of 5. The independent variable is truncated labor share 
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